

789

Million Dollars



Regain

Yemen

مبادرة استعادة

in **14** months

How do Hodeidah ports finance

THE HOUTHİ WAR?


Issued: March 2025

- The importance of the ports of Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Issa as key funding tools for the Houthi militias
- The exploitation of the ports in smuggling weapons and threatening international maritime security

- HODEIDAH PORTS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL RESOLUTIONS AND FIELD REALITY.
- HOUTHİ CONTROL CONTINUES DESPITE THE STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT.
- LACK OF EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS SUCH AS RESOLUTIONS 2140 AND 2216.
- THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN LIMITING THE EXPLOITATION OF PORTS TO FINANCE WAR.
- INEVITABLE MEASURES TO STOP THE FLOW OF FUNDS TO THE HOUTHİS.
- CLOSING PORTS AND DIVERTING IMPORTS TO THE PORTS OF ADEN, HADRAMAWT, MOKHA, SHABWA AND AL-MAHRA.
- IMPOSE STRICT CONTROL OVER THE MOVEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SHIPMENTS AND FINANCING.
- PUNISH COMPANIES AND SUPPLIERS COLLABORATING WITH THE HOUTHİS.
- ACTIVATING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND TIGHTENING SANCTIONS.
- STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO MONITOR THE RED SEA AND PREVENT ARMS AND FUEL SMUGGLING.

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INTRODUCTION

Yemen's strategic ports—particularly Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Issa—serve as a vital financial resource for the Houthi militias. The Houthis seized control of these maritime gateways and other state institutions after invading the capital, Sanaa, in September 2014, and subsequently expanding into multiple Yemeni governorates, including Al-Hudaydah in 2015. The roots of these militias trace back to 2004, when they emerged as an armed rebellion in Saada Governorate, citing sectarian and economic grievances. Over time, they transformed into a coup force, exploiting governmental weakness and internal divisions to militarily and politically expand, ultimately overthrowing constitutional legitimacy and seizing control of state institutions, including economic and service sectors.

The militias' violations extend beyond financial plunder. They have converted Hodeidah's ports into platforms for smuggling advanced Iranian weapons, such as hypersonic missiles and drones, which are used in cross-border attacks—including targeting oil facilities in Saudi Arabia and the UAE—and disrupting international navigation in the Red Sea. The militias have also engaged in maritime piracy by detaining commercial ships and threatening global supply chains, a tactic aimed at politically and economically blackmailing the international community. This has further complicated regional crises and undermined international maritime security.



INTRODUCTION

Additionally, the militias have turned port revenues into a tool to fund their internal and external wars by imposing illegal tax and customs fees and seizing oil derivative revenues. They exploited the previous government's 2019 Decision No. 49, which authorized fuel import fees to support the public treasury, diverting it into a mechanism to illicitly collect billions of riyals. The militias also plunder state resources through other fees, such as taxes on commercial goods and services, exacerbating Yemen's economic collapse and deepening the humanitarian crisis.

This systematic exploitation blatantly violates international law and United Nations Security Council resolutions, particularly Resolution 2216 (2015), which calls for halting the militias' illicit funding and imposing sanctions on their leaders. The Houthis have been designated a terrorist group by several nations for targeting civilians and undermining peace efforts. This report highlights the Houthis' financial extraction mechanisms, their impact on prolonging the conflict, and urges the international community to enforce accountability measures to stop the looting of public funds.



ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMS AND TAX FEES IMPOSED ON GOODS VIA HODEIDAH PORTS

Fuel Derivatives

Kerosene:

Customs and tax rate: 16.4%

This high rate on a vital commodity used for cooking and heating increases costs for citizens.

Gas:

Customs and tax rate: 16.4%

As the primary household energy source, these fees raise gas cylinder prices, worsening living expenses.

Mazut (Heavy Fuel Oil):

Customs and tax rate: 16.4%

Used to power factories and generators, these fees elevate industrial production and energy costs.

Diesel:

Customs and tax rate: 16.4%

A critical fuel for heavy vehicles and generators, these fees directly increase transportation and electricity prices.


Petrol (Gasoline):

Customs and tax rate: 21.4%

The highest rate among fuel derivatives, reflecting the militias' exploitation of high gasoline demand to generate massive revenues, driving up transport costs.

ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMS AND TAX FEES IMPOSED ON GOODS VIA HODEIDAH PORTS

Monthly Oil Quantities Chart



ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMS AND TAX FEES IMPOSED ON GOODS VIA HODEIDAH PORTS

- Containerized and General Goods: Taxed at 7.5%—lower than fuel but still high compared to standard customs rates.
- Construction Materials (Iron, Wood, Cement/Clinker): Taxed at 5%, inflating building and real estate development costs.
- Food Items (Sugar, Flour, Vegetable Oils, Corn, Soybeans, and Other Staples): Taxed at 5%, raising prices of essentials and worsening economic suffering.
- Wheat and Rice: No explicit tax rate stated, but likely subject to other customs estimates or partial exemptions.

The Houthis impose exorbitant fees on fuel as an indispensable commodity while taxing other goods at moderate to high rates, collectively inflating living costs and crippling the local economy through elevated prices for goods and services.



HODEIDAH PORTS: THE LIFELINE OF FUNDING FOR THE HOUTHI TERRORIST MILITIAS

\$789 Million in One Year:

How Do Hodeidah Ports Fund the Houthi War?

From May 2023 to June 2024, the Houthis collected approximately \$789.9 million from taxes and customs duties imposed on imports through the ports of Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Issa. These massive revenues represent a primary source of funding for the militias' war efforts, in blatant defiance of international resolutions that prohibit financing the group, which is classified as terrorist.

■ Imports and Duties: Figures tell the Truth


The total value of imports through Hodeidah ports reached 7.61 billion, of which approximately 7.61 billion, of which approximately 332.6 million were taxes and customs duties on gasoline imports alone. Meanwhile, taxes collected on diesel amounted to 173.9 million, and on fuel oil, 173.9 million, and on fuel oil, 12.3 million. Gas, on the other hand, represented a significant source of income, with the militias imposing duties worth \$95.7 million.

The Houthi levies were not limited to fuel; they extended to basic food commodities. The militias earned 20.9 million from wheat imports, 20.9 million from wheat imports, 5.8 million from sugar, and \$2.7 million from rice. Cement, iron, and wood were also subjected to exorbitant taxes, further bolstering the resources of the armed group.




HODEIDAH PORTS: THE LIFELINE OF FUNDING FOR THE HOUTHJI TERRORIST MILITIAS


**Chart showing the quality and value of goods arriving at Hodeidah ports
During the period May 2023 - June 2024**



Item name	Value in USD
Other foods	10,966,200
Corn+Soybeans	397,406,438
Bulk Wheat	1,266,281,486
Sugar	418,939,221
Flour	117,101,304
Rice	204,949,073
Vegetable Oils	55,830,550



Item name	Value in USD
General Goods	166,026,000
Steel	486,475,570
Woods	65,900,817
Cement+Clinker	58,899,153



Item name	Value in USD
Kerosene	3,320,923
Gas	583,891,200
Mazut	75,492,600
Diesel	1,060,764,285
Petroleum	1,554,255,000
Containers	1,088,170,800

TOTAL | 7,614,670,622



HODEIDAH PORTS: THE LIFELINE OF FUNDING FOR THE HOUTHJI TERRORIST MILITIAS

Hodeidah Ports: Between International Resolutions and Ground Realities

The ports of Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Issa have been under Houthi control since 2014. Despite the Stockholm Agreement, which stipulated the redeployment of militia forces from the ports under UN supervision, the Houthis have continued to use them to fund their military operations. UN Security Council resolutions, particularly Resolution 2140, which imposes sanctions on individuals and entities threatening peace in Yemen, and Resolution 2216, which calls for cutting off funding sources to the Houthi militias, have not been effectively implemented on the ground. This has allowed the militias to turn these ports into tools for plundering Yemen's economy.



THE IMPACT OF REVENUES ON THE ECONOMY AND LIVING CONDITIONS

The Houthi control over Hodeidah ports has led to drastic changes in the local economy, as the militias imposed high customs duties on various essential goods. This caused prices to rise by up to 40%, making many basic commodities unaffordable for citizens and leading to a deterioration in living standards. Access to food and essential goods has become a challenge for many Yemeni families, especially amid the country's suffocating economic crisis.

Industrial and commercial activities have also significantly declined due to rising fuel prices, which directly impacted production costs. This has forced many factories and small businesses to shut down, resulting in job losses and a decline in local productive capacity. This industrial stagnation has disrupted domestic supply chains and increased the local market's reliance on imports, exacerbating the economic crisis.

In addition, the Houthis' economic policies have contributed to a decline in individual income and rising unemployment rates. This economic downturn has left many citizens without income sources, pushing them to seek alternative job opportunities or migrate. The deteriorating economic situation has also led to increased poverty rates and heightened levels of human suffering in areas under Houthi control.

Regarding the energy sector, areas under Houthi control have experienced a severe electricity crisis. The rise in fuel oil and diesel prices has caused many power plants to malfunction, further exacerbating citizens' suffering. This severe electricity shortage has not only affected individuals' lives but has also led to the shutdown of many health and educational facilities, deepening the humanitarian crisis and worsening the social situation.

THE IMPACT OF REVENUES ON THE ECONOMY AND LIVING CONDITIONS

Moreover, the rise in fuel prices has increased transportation costs, directly impacting internal trade movement between provinces. This increase has led to additional price hikes for goods and services in local markets, further exacerbating the living pressures on citizens and reducing the purchasing power of Yemeni families.

In summary, the financial revenues generated by the militias from Hodeidah ports are being used to fund military activities rather than improving the economic and living conditions of citizens. This illicit use of revenues prolongs the conflict and increases the suffering of the Yemeni people, necessitating effective international intervention to ensure these resources are used to meet the population's needs and achieve economic stability.

The Increase in Customs Duties Has Led to:

- **Inflation of Basic Commodity Prices:** Prices have risen by up to 40%, making many basic goods unaffordable for citizens;
- **Decline in Industrial and Commercial Activity:** Rising fuel prices have increased production costs, leading to the closure of several factories and small businesses;
- **Decrease in Individual Income and Rising Unemployment:** The Houthis' economic policies have caused an economic downturn, leaving many citizens without income sources;
- **Severe Electricity Crisis:** The increased cost of fuel oil and diesel has caused many power plants to malfunction, exacerbating citizens' suffering.

THE HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES OF THE HOUTHIS' CONTROL OVER THE PORTS

The Houthis' control over Hodeidah ports has deeply impacted the humanitarian situation in Yemen. Their economic policies have exacerbated the food security crisis, as rising food prices have increased hunger and malnutrition rates, particularly among children, the most vulnerable group. Due to the high costs of importing basic food commodities such as wheat, rice, and sugar, securing balanced meals has become difficult for many Yemeni families. This crisis has led to the spread of malnutrition-related diseases, threatening children's lives and negatively affecting their physical and mental development.

The healthcare sector has also sharply deteriorated due to rising medicine prices and fuel shortages needed to operate medical facilities. This shortage has forced many hospitals and health centers to close, leaving thousands of patients without basic medical care. In this context, the suffering of patients with chronic diseases such as diabetes and heart conditions has worsened, alongside rising mortality rates due to the inability to provide necessary treatment. The fuel crisis has also disrupted the transportation of medical supplies, making it harder to combat epidemics and infectious diseases.

Additionally, the clean water crisis has emerged as one of the most significant humanitarian consequences. Rising fuel costs have affected the operation of desalination plants, leading to a severe shortage of potable water. This shortage has forced many residents to rely on unsafe water sources, resulting in the spread of waterborne diseases such as cholera and typhoid. This crisis is one of the most critical humanitarian challenges, especially given the difficulty in accessing healthcare facilities to treat related illnesses.



THE HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES OF THE HOUTHIS' CONTROL OVER THE PORTS

The water crisis has also fueled local conflicts over scarce water resources, further complicating the humanitarian landscape. In rural communities, this crisis has reduced agricultural production, as farmers rely heavily on water for irrigation. This decline in agricultural output has, in turn, driven up food prices, exacerbating the food security crisis and negatively impacting economic and living stability.

These humanitarian consequences reflect the scale of the crisis Yemenis are facing due to the Houthis' control over the Ports. This control has not been used to improve living conditions but has instead deepened humanitarian suffering, necessitating urgent international action to address these crises and ensure that resources reach those in need without being exploited to fund the conflict.

Key Humanitarian Consequences of the Militias' Control Over Hodeidah Ports Can Be Summarized As:

- **Food Insecurity:** Rising food prices have increased hunger and malnutrition rates, especially among children;
- **Deterioration of the Healthcare Sector:** Rising medicine prices and fuel shortages in hospitals have led to the closure of many medical facilities;
- **Clean Water Crisis:** Rising fuel costs have impacted desalination plants, resulting in a shortage of potable water.

GAPS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT

The Stockholm Agreement, reached in December 2018, was a UN and international initiative aimed at rescuing the Houthis from collapse in Hodeidah city and preventing them from losing control over its strategic ports (Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Issa). The agreement stipulated the redeployment of forces in the city and ports under UN supervision to ensure the flow of humanitarian aid and to neutralize the ports from armed conflict. However, the agreement faced numerous challenges and gaps that hindered its full implementation, enabling the Houthis to maintain control over the ports and use them for economic and military gains.

One of the most significant gaps in the agreement's implementation was the weakness of UN monitoring mechanisms. Monitoring tools were not effectively activated, allowing the Houthis to continue controlling the ports without effective international oversight. Insufficient monitoring forces were deployed, and technical and political obstacles prevented UN teams from operating freely. This lack of oversight enabled the Houthis to persist in implementing their financial and military policies away from the eyes of the international community.

Additionally, the lack of transparency in managing revenues generated from the ports posed a major problem. The agreement required that revenues be deposited in the Central Bank of Yemen in Hodeidah to pay government employees' salaries. However, the militias did not comply with this provision and instead retained the revenues to support their war efforts. This clear violation undermined one of the agreement's key objectives: Alleviating the economic burden on citizens in Houthi-controlled areas.

GAPS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT

The continued military smuggling through the ports represents another critical gap in the agreement. Despite provisions prohibiting the use of the ports for military purposes, the smuggling of advanced weapons, including missiles and drones, persisted. These military activities not only impacted Yemen internally but also extended to threatening international navigation in the Red Sea and targeting vital facilities in neighboring countries, further complicating the regional crisis.

Moreover, the Houthis obstructed UN supervision by harassing UN staff, hindering the implementation of provisions related to monitoring and overseeing the ports. UN personnel faced intimidation and restrictions on their movements, preventing them from carrying out their duties effectively. This deliberate obstruction made it difficult to ensure the neutrality of the ports and prevent their use for conflict financing.

As for the government's role, it was marked by a lack of assertiveness in enforcing the agreement. Although the legitimate Yemeni government agreed to the agreement, it failed to exert sufficient international pressure to ensure full compliance with its terms. The absence of a clear strategy to follow up on implementation also contributed to the ports remaining under Houthi control. This governmental failure, combined with weak UN oversight and Houthi practices, turned the Stockholm Agreement from an opportunity for peace into an incompletely implemented document, prolonging the conflict and hindering peace efforts in Yemen.



GAPS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT

Summary of the Gaps in the Agreement:




- **Weak Monitoring Mechanisms:** UN monitoring mechanisms were not effectively activated, allowing the Houthis to maintain control over the ports;
- **Lack of Transparency in Revenue Management:** The militias failed to comply with the agreement's requirement to deposit revenues in the Yemeni Central Bank;
- **Continued Military Smuggling:** Despite the agreement, weapons smuggling operations persisted, fueling the conflict;
- **Obstruction of UN Oversight:** UN staff faced harassment, hindering the implementation of monitoring and supervision provisions.



RECOMMENDATIONS

- Essential Measures to Stop the Flow of Funds to the Houthis;
- Closing the ports of Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Issa to import operations, and redirecting commercial activities to the ports of Aden and Mukalla, to ensure that the Houthis do not benefit from tax revenues;
- Imposing strict oversight on shipments arriving in Yemen through the Arab Coalition, to prevent the smuggling of fuel and goods into areas controlled by the militias;
- Imposing sanctions on international companies and suppliers involved in facilitating the import of goods through Houthi-controlled ports, and urging global banks to impose restrictions on financial transfers linked to these operations;
- Activating UNSC resolutions and expanding international sanctions on the Houthis, including preventing them from exploiting the international banking system to manage their illicit revenues;
- Enhancing cooperation between the United States and the Arab Coalition to monitor ship movements in the Red Sea, and preventing any attempts to fund the militias under the guise of humanitarian trade.
- Amid the ongoing war, the ports of Hodeidah remain one of the most critical economic lifelines fueling the Houthi military machine. Without decisive international action, these ports will continue to be a major source of terrorist financing in Yemen, at the expense of millions of civilians who bear the heaviest cost.


The most important goods that arrived in the port of Hodeidah



TOTAL | 13,886,347



اسم الصنف	القيمة بالدولار	قيمة الضرائب والجمارك والرسوم بالدولار الأمريكي Other
Kerosene	3,320,923.84	544,631.51
Gas	583,891,200.00	95,758,156.80
Mazut	75,492,600.00	12,380,786.40
Diesel	1,060,764,285.00	173,965,342.74
Petroleum	1,554,255,000.00	332,610,570.00
Containers	1,088,170,800.00	81,612,810.00
General Goods	166,026,000.00	12,451,950.00
Steel	486,475,570.00	24,323,778.50
Woods	65,900,817.00	3,295,040.85
كليينكر Cement	58,899,153.00	2,944,957.65
Other غذائية	10,966,200.00	548,310.00
Corn + Soybeans	397,406,438.40	19,870,321.92
Bulk Wheat	1,266,281,486.00	-
Sugar	418,939,221.60	20,946,961.08
Flour	117,101,304.00	-
Rice	204,949,073.55	-
Vegetable Oils	55,830,550.00	2,791,527.50
Total	7,614,670,622	789,900,210.15



ATTACHMENTS

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الجمهورية اليمنية
رئاسة مجلس الوزراء
الإمانة العامة

قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (49) لعام 2019م
بشأن

إعادة العمل بالبيات إستيراد المشتقات النفطية من قبل مصافي عدن والبيات التوزيع لجميع محافظات الجمهورية

أطلع مجلس الوزراء على المذكرة المقدمة من وزيرى المالية والنفط والمعادن ومحافظة البنك المركزي بشأن إعادة العمل بالبيات استيراد المشتقات النفطية من قبل شركة مصافي عدن والبيات التوزيع لجميع محافظات الجمهورية وأقر الآتي:-

- 1- على محافظ البنك المركزي إصدار خطاب ضمان بنكي لصالح استيراد المشتقات النفطية .
- 2- على شركة مصافي عدن القيام بالآتي :-
 - أ- استيراد المواد النفطية من السوق العالمية وفقاً للأليات والضوابط التي كان معمول بها سابقاً وفقاً لإجراءات لتضمن الشفافية.
 - ب- البيع لشركة النفط اليمنية لتوزيع المشتقات لجميع محافظات الجمهورية ولن يرغب من موزعي القطاع الخاص بالعملة المحلية وبما يتواءم مع الأسعار العالمية مضافاً إليها الضرائب والرسوم الجمركية والعوائد الأخرى المفروضة بموجب القوانين السارية.
 - ج- توريد الضرائب والرسوم الجمركية والعوائد الأخرى المحصلة إلى حسابات الجبات المعنية في البنك المركزي اليمني.
 - د- الفحص الفني لجميع المشتقات التي تدخل الجمهورية اليمنية والتأكد من سلامة مواصفاتها وبما يؤكد قانونية مصدرها.
- 3- على وزيرى النفط والمعادن و المالية ومحافظة البنك المركزي تشكيل لجنة فنية من الجبات ذات العلاقة لإعداد آلية تنفيذية لهذا القرار وبما يتكامل مع الآلية التنفيذية للقرار رقم (75) لسنة 2018م ورفعها إلى رئيس مجلس الوزراء لتعنيدها.
- 4- يطبق هذا القرار على مراحل تحددها الآلية التنفيذية ويتم تحصيل الرسوم الجمركية والضريبة والعوائد الحكومية الأخرى من تاريخ إصدار هذا القرار.
- 5- يتخذ القرار بالوسائل الإدارية المناسبة.
- 6- يبدأ تنفيذ القرار من تاريخ 2019/06/26م ويلتزم بتنفيذ أحكامه.

المستفيدون	المتشعرون	المستفيدون	المتشعرون
مشارك	لا يوجد	لا يوجد	لا يوجد
رئيس اللجنة			
وزير المالية			
وزير النفط والمعادن			
محافظ البنك المركزي			
مدير شركة مصافي عدن			
رئيس مصلحة الجوازات			
مدير عام شركة النفط اليمنية			
رئيس مصلحة الضرائب			
اللجنة الاقتصادية			

مادة القرار: ينظر
مضمون القرار: خشي النفط والمعادن والنفط والمعادن والنفط والمعادن والنفط والمعادن
شكل القرار: عام
جهة التوقيع: مشترك
تاريخ القرار: 2019/06/26

ATTACHMENTS

اللجنة الاقتصادية ECONOMIC COMMITTEE



بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

التاريخ: 2019/08/09م

تعميم رقم (5) لسنة 2019م بشأن

تطبيق قرار الحكومة رقم 49 لعام 2019 بشأن إعادة العمل باليات استيراد المشتقات النفطية من قبل

مصافي عدن وآليات التوزيع لجميع محافظات الجمهورية.

الأخوة/ مستوردي المشتقات النفطية المحترمين

الأخوة / وكلاء وشركات ومكاتب الملاحة المحترمين

بناء على قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم 49 لسنة 2019م، الصادر في تاريخ 2019/06/26م، والذي ينص على أن:

- 1- يطبق القرار بشكل متكامل مع قرار الحكومة رقم 75 لعام 2018، وآلية التنفيذ.
- 2- تحصيل الرسوم القانونية (الجمركية والضريبية والعوائد الأخرى) على جميع شحنات المشتقات النفطية المستوردة والمشحونة إلى مناطق الجمهورية اليمنية، وذلك ابتداء من تاريخ إصدار القرار.
- 3- حصر جهة الفحص الفني وإصدار شهادة المنشأ والمواصفات المعتمدة من قبل اللجنة الاقتصادية على شركة مصافي عدن.

لقد تقرر:

- أولاً: اعتماد سداد الرسوم المحددة بالقرار إلى الحسابات الخاصة بها (في البنك المركزي اليمني - عدن، أو أي بنك يفوضه البنك المركزي اليمني)، شرطاً أساسياً للحصول على وثيقة موافقة الحكومة على شحن واستيراد الشحنة إلى أي من الموانئ اليمنية، الصادرة من اللجنة الاقتصادية، وذلك على جميع الشحنات التي تقدمت بطلباتها للجنة بعد تاريخ صدور القرار، على أن يتم ذلك وفقاً للتالي:
- 1- يتم احتساب الرسوم الجمركية والضرائب والعوائد الأخرى المحددة بالقرار وفقاً للقوانين الخاصة بها، واعتماد سعر الصرف وفقاً لنشرة الصرف الجمركية، وبالشكل التالي:

الرسوم الحكومية	بنزين	ديزل	غاز	كبروسين	مازوت
الرسوم الجمركية	10%	5%	10%	5%	10%
ضريبة المبيعات من (القيمة + الرسوم)	5%	5%	5%	5%	5%
ضريبة الأرباح التجارية من (القيمة + الرسوم)	1.4%	1.4%	1.4%	1.4%	1.4%
ضريبة المركبات	25 قس/لتر	15 قس/لتر	0	0	0
صندوق الطرق والجسور	5%	5%	0	0	0
صندوق التشجيع الزراعي والسمكي	0	1 ريال/ لتر	0	0	0
صندوق الثقافة والتراث	1 ريال/ طرد	1 ريال/ طرد	1 ريال/ طرد	1 ريال/ طرد	1 ريال/ طرد
مجالس محلية	100 ريال / طن	100 ريال / طن	100 ريال / طن	100 ريال / طن	100 ريال / طن
صندوق تحسين المدينة	100 ريال / طن	100 ريال / طن	100 ريال / طن	100 ريال / طن	100 ريال / طن
رسوم فتح بيان جمركي	الف ريال/ بيان	الف ريال/ بيان	الف ريال/ بيان	الف ريال/ بيان	الف ريال/ بيان
رسوم مطبوعات	60 ريال/ بيان	60 ريال/ بيان	60 ريال/ بيان	60 ريال/ بيان	60 ريال/ بيان
صندوق المعائن	100 ريال/ بيان	100 ريال/ بيان	100 ريال/ بيان	100 ريال/ بيان	100 ريال/ بيان

ملاحظة: ضريبة الأرباح على شركة مصافي عدن وشركة النفط اليمنية (1%) بينما على القطاع الخاص (1.4%) للاستيراد على البحر

ATTACHMENTS

اللجنة الاقتصادية
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE



- 2- يتم التوريد من قبل التاجر بموجب حافظة التوريد التي ترسل له من قبل اللجنة الاقتصادية بعد احتساب تلك الرسوم، و إلى الحسابات المحلية و الخارجية المحددة في حافظة التوريد المشار إليها.
 - 3- تعتبر نشرة بلائس المحددة لأسعار المشتقات النفطية أساس في اعتماد القيمة الجمركية للمشتقات النفطية التي بموجبها يتم احتساب الرسوم الجمركية و الضرائب و العوائد الأخرى في حال كانت القيمة المصرح عنها أقل من نشرة بلائس (مع إضافة اجور النقل و التأمين (CIF) و في حالة ما تكون القيمة المصرح فيها أعلى من نشرة بلائس يتم اعتماد القيم الأعلى.
 - 4- يحق للتاجر أو الشركة المستوردة في حال تم اكتشاف أي خطأ في عملية الاحتساب تقديم تظلم و إرساله عبر البريد الإلكتروني الخاص بالمكتب الفني للجنة الاقتصادية، مع تحدد الخطأ المكتشف.
 - 5- تقديم أيا من الوثائق التالية لإثبات عملية السداد:
 - أ- شيك مقبول الدفع بالقيمة الإجمالية للرسوم الحكومية المحددة و المذكورة أعلاه.
 - ب- اشعار توريد نقدي للحسابات المحددة، بإجمالي القيمة وفقاً لحافظة التوريد المرسله للتاجر من اللجنة الاقتصادية.
 - 6- لمرة واحدة فقط ستقبل اللجنة منح التاجر أو الشركة المستوردة استثناء على ما ورد أعلاه و ذلك في حال تعهد (أو تعهدت) بالسداد بعد دخول الشحنة و تفريغها و تقديم شيك مصرفي كضمان، على انه لن يتم منح أي شحنة لاحقة له وثيقة الموافقة دون استكمال سداد الرسوم الخاصة بتلك الشحنة السابقة، وفقاً لهذا التعميم.
- ثانياً: يستمر العمل وفقاً للتعميم رقم 3 و التعميم رقم 4 للعام 2019م، فيما يخص موانئ الشحن و شهادة المنشأ و الفحص الفني.

صادر عن اللجنة الاقتصادية



ATTACHMENTS

Activ ity of Yemeni Red Sea Ports (Hodeidah – Salif – Ras Issa Oil Terminal) during May 2023

Total	Quality of Unleaded Fuel Products (in Tons)					Quality of Unloaded Goods (in Tons)												Port
	Kerosene	Gas	Mazut	Diesel	Petroleum	Containers	General Goods	Steel	Woods	Cement	Other	Corn + Soybeans	Bulk Wheat	Sugar	Flour	Rice	Vegetable Oils	
452,372	0	33,649	8,994	14,571	71,937	14,590	0	59,551	21,477	9,550	0	122,658	57,260	23,328	0	14,807	0	Hodeidah
266,315	0	0	0	0	0	0	44,058	0	0	132,800	0	9,449	80,008	0	0	0	0	Salif
70,012	0	0	0	70,012	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Ras Issa
788,699	0	33,649	8,994	84,583	71,937	14,590	44,058	59,551	21,477	142,350	0	132,107	137,268	23,328	0	14,807	0	Total
	199,163					589,536												

Total Container Throughput				Total Outgoing Goods			Number of Arrived Marine Floats					
Total	Outgoing	Incoming	Ships on Standby	Quantity (in tons)	Type of Goods	Port	Total	Wooden Ships	Oil Tankers	Ships Containers	General Cargo Ships	Port
				0	Bran	Hodeidah	28	0	9	3	16	Hodeidah
				0	"	Salif	9	0	0	0	9	Salif
				0	"	Ras Issa	2	0	2	0	0	Ras Issa
2,139	1,087	882	170	0	Total		39	0	11	3	25	Total

ATTACHMENTS

Activity of Yemeni Red Sea Ports (Hodeidah – Salif – Ras Issa Oil Terminal) during June 2023

Total	Quality of Unleaded Fuel Products (in Tons)					Quality of Unloaded Goods (in Tons)												Port
	Kerosene	Gas	Mazut	Diesel	Petroleum	Containers	General Goods	Steel	Woods	Cement	Other	Corn + Soybeans	Bulk Wheat	Sugar	Flour	Rice	Vegetable Oils	
546,658	0	26,273	8,983	0	120,409	53,756	0	34,734	0	0	0	62,047	171,766	0	22,637	28,288	17,765	Hodeidah
284,491	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	129,100	0	0	104,590	50,801	0	0	0	Salif
96,640	0	14,800	0	81,840	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Ras Issa
927,789	0	41,073	8,983	81,840	120,409	53,756	0	34,734	0	129,100	0	62,047	276,356	50,801	22,637	28,288	17,765	Total
	252,305					675,484												

Total Container Throughput

Total	Outgoing	Incoming	Ships on Standby
4,883	1,587	2,962	334

Total Outgoing Goods

Quantity (in tons)	Type of Goods	Port
5,500	Bran	Hodeidah
0	"	Salif
0	"	Ras Issa
5,500	Total	

Number of Arrived Marine Floats

Total	Wooden Ships	Oil Tankers	Ships Containers	General Cargo Ships	Port
31	0	8	6	17	Hodeidah
7	0	0	0	7	Salif
3	0	3	0	0	Ras Issa
41	0	11	6	24	Total

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Activity of Yemeni Red Sea Ports (Hodeidah – Salif – Ras Issa Oil Terminal) during July 2023

Total	Quality of Unleaded Fuel Products (in Tons)					Quality of Unloaded Goods (in Tons)												Port
	Kerosene	Gas	Mazut	Diesel	Petroleum	Containers	General Goods	Steel	Woods	Cement	Other	Corn + Soybeans	Bulk Wheat	Sugar	Flour	Rice	Vegetable Oils	
486,445	0	24,328	14,344	13,863	111,387	95,041	0	81,080	17,113	8,000	0	31,000	27,450	23,276	25,406	14,157	0	Hodeidah
159,432	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,582	28,500	0	0	104,350	0	23,000	0	0	Salif
121,600	0	40,600	0	81,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Ras Issa
767,477	0	64,928	14,344	94,863	111,387	95,041	0	81,080	20,695	36,500	0	31,000	131,800	23,276	48,406	14,157	0	Total
	285,522					481,955												

Total	Outgoing	Incoming	Ships on Standby
0			

Quantity (in tons)	Type of Goods	Port
	Bran	Hodeidah
0	“	Salif
0	“	Ras Issa
0	Total	

Total	Wooden Ships	Oil Tankers	Ships Containers	General Cargo Ships	Port
37	0	12	11	14	Hodeidah
5	0	0	0	5	Salif
6	0	6	0	0	Ras Issa
48	0	18	11	19	Total

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Activity of Yemeni Red Sea Ports (Hodeidah – Salif – Ras Issa Oil Terminal) during August 2023

Total	Quality of Unleaded Fuel Products (in Tons)					Quality of Unloaded Goods (in Tons)												Port
	Kerosene	Gas	Mazut	Diesel	Petroleum	Containers	General Goods	Steel	Woods	Cement	Other	Corn + Soybeans	Bulk Wheat	Sugar	Flour	Rice	Vegetable Oils	
505,438	0	0	9,008	11,824	82,646	98,873	12,445	2,991	0	0	0	56,505	169,473	25,078	8,022	28,573	0	Hodeidah
247,496	0	0	0	0	0	0	49,500	0	0	45,500	12,000	6,122	134,374	0	0	0	0	Salif
149,570	0	69,114	0	80,456	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Ras Issa
902,504	0	69,114	9,008	92,280	82,646	98,873	61,945	2,991	0	45,500	12,000	62,627	303,847	25,078	8,022	28,573	0	Total
	253,048					649,456												

Total	Outgoing	Incoming	Ships on Standby
13,512	6,153	6,753	606

Quantity (in tons)	Type of Goods	Port
112	cigarette cartons	Hodeidah
0	"	Salif
0	"	Ras Issa
112	Total	

Total	Wooden Ships	Oil Tankers	Ships Containers	General Cargo Ships	Port
31	1	5	11	14	Hodeidah
8	0	0	0	8	Salif
5	0	5	0	0	Ras Issa
44	1	10	11	22	Total

ATTACHMENTS

Activity of Yemeni Red Sea Ports (Hodeidah – Salif – Ras Issa Oil Terminal) during September 2023

Total	Quality of Unleaded Fuel Products (in Tons)					Quality of Unloaded Goods (in Tons)												Port
	Kerosene	Gas	Mazut	Diesel	Petroleum	Containers	General Goods	Steel	Woods	Cement+ Clinker	Other	Corn + Soybeans	Bulk Wheat	Sugar	Flour	Rice	Vegetable Oils	
476,016	0	0	15,000	43,621	108,065	127,244	0	44,503	25,875	5,800	0	30,029	28,581	0	27,355	6,908	13,035	Hodeidah
294,546	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	132,000	0	31,166	78,880	52,500	0	0	0	Salif
153,632	0	29,310	0	124,322	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Ras Issa
924,194	0	29,310	15,000	167,943	108,065	127,244	0	44,503	25,875	137,800	0	61,195	107,461	52,500	27,355	6,908	13,035	Total
	320,318					603,876												

Total	Outgoing	Incoming	Ships on Standby
15,847	6,481	8,724	642

Quantity (in tons)	Type of Goods	Port
0	"	Hodeidah
0	"	Salif
0	"	Ras Issa
0	Total	

Total	Wooden Ships	Oil Tankers	Ships Containers	General Cargo Ships	Port
32	0	9	11	12	Hodeidah
8	0	0	0	8	Salif
5	0	5	0	0	Ras Issa
45	0	14	11	20	Total

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Activity of Yemeni Red Sea Ports (Hodeidah – Salif – Ras Issa Oil Terminal) during October 2023

Total	Quality of Unleaded Fuel Products (in Tons)					Quality of Unloaded Goods (in Tons)											Port	
	Kerosene	Gas	Mazut	Diesel	Petroleum	Containers	General Goods	Steel	Woods	Cement+ Clinker	Other	Corn + Soybeans	Bulk Wheat	Sugar	Flour	Rice		Vegetable Oils
672,915	0	0	0	0	91,602	140,752	0	65,686	7,056	44,694	561	92,670	141,554	26,687	21,190	40,463	0	Hodeidah
286,233	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,851	49,000	0	40,012	160,374	22,000	0	11,996	0	Salif
153,636	0	35,900	0	117,736	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Ras Issa
1,112,784	0	35,900	0	117,736	91,602	140,752	0	65,686	9,907	93,694	561	132,682	301,928	48,687	21,190	52,459	0	Total
245,238					867,546													

Total Container Throughput				Total Outgoing Goods			Number of Arrived Marine Floats					
Total	Outgoing	Incoming	Ships on Standby	Quantity (in tons)	Type of Goods	Port	Total	Wooden Ships	Oil Tankers	Ships Containers	General Cargo Ships	Port
				10,500	Bran	Hodeidah	38	0	3	13	22	Hodeidah
				0	"	Salif	8	0	0	0	8	Salif
				0	"	Ras Issa	7	0	7	0	0	Ras Issa
18,410	7,659	9,909	842	10,500	Total		53	0	10	13	30	Total

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Activity of Yemeni Red Sea Ports (Hodeidah – Salif – Ras Issa Oil Terminal) during November 2023

Total	Quality of Unleaded Fuel Products (in Tons)					Quality of Unloaded Goods (in Tons)												Port
	Kerosene	Gas	Mazut	Diesel	Petroleum	Containers	General Goods	Steel	Woods	Cement+ Clinker	Other	Corn + Soybeans	Bulk Wheat	Sugar	Flour	Rice	Vegetable Oils	
603,189	4,384	14,999	0	10,687	120,552	194,314	0	49,931	0	0	0	30,635	135,685	23,463	13,025	5,514	0	Hodeidah
386,262	0	0	0	0	0	0	15,133	23,481	0	89,800	0	98,670	106,678	52,500	0	0	0	Salif
164,073	0	44,614	0	119,459	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Ras Issa
1,153,524	4,384	59,613	0	130,146	120,552	194,314	15,133	73,412	0	89,800	0	129,305	242,363	75,963	13,025	5,514	0	Total
	314,695					838,829												

Total	Outgoing	Incoming	Ships on Standby
24,824	11,312	12,516	996

Quantity (in tons)	Type of Goods	Port
0	Bran	Hodeidah
6,872	Mawalis	Salif
0	"	Ras Issa
6,872	Total	

Total	Wooden Ships	Oil Tankers	Ships Containers	General Cargo Ships	Port
34	0	7	15	12	Hodeidah
10	0	0	0	10	Salif
4	0	4	0	0	Ras Issa
48	0	11	15	22	Total

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Activity of Yemeni Red Sea Ports (Hodeidah – Salif – Ras Issa Oil Terminal) during December 2023

Total	Quality of Unleaded Fuel Products (in Tons)					Quality of Unloaded Goods (in Tons)												Port	
	Kerosene	Gas	Mazut	Diesel	Petroleum	Containers	General Goods	Steel	Woods	Cement + Clinker	Other	Corn + Soybeans	Bulk Wheat	Sugar	Flour	Rice	Vegetable Oils		
643,763	0	0	14,954	2,997	82,787	182,980	48	70,261	16,132	9,000	398	30,765	138,712	62,703	11,954	20,072	0	Hodeidah	
251,679	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	129,200	0	38,994	43,950	30,000	9,535	0	0	Salif	
160,609	0	54,111	0	106,498	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Ras Issa	
1,056,051	0	54,111	14,954	109,495	82,787	182,980	48	70,261	16,132	138,200	398	69,759	182,662	92,703	21,489	20,072	0	Total	
261,347					794,704														

Total	Outgoing	Incoming	Ships on Standby
23,544	10,799	11,873	872

Quantity (in tons)	Type of Goods	Port
5,000	Bran	Hodeidah
0	"	Salif
0	"	Ras Issa
5,000	Total	

Total	Wooden Ships	Oil Tankers	Ships Containers	General Cargo Ships	Port
43	0	6	14	23	Hodeidah
8	0	0	0	8	Salif
4	0	4	0	0	Ras Issa
55	0	10	14	31	Total

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Activ ity of Yemeni Red Sea Ports (Hodeidah – Sal if – Ras Issa Oil Terminal) during January 2024

Total	Quality of Unleaded Fuel Products (in Tons)					Quality of Unloaded Goods (in Tons)											Port	
	Kerosene	Gas	Mazut	Diesel	Petroleum	Containers	General Goods	Steel	Woods	Cement + Clinker	Other	Corn + Soybeans	Bulk Wheat	Sugar	Flour	Rice		Vegetable Oils
660,826	0	0	0	28,673	112,736	247,930	5,005	68,055	0	0	194	0	115,969	30,094	0	36,124	16,046	Hodeidah
362,893	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	27,419	0	101,996	0	52,641	128,337	52,500	0	0	0	Salif
202,129	0	64,473	0	137,656	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Ras Issa
1,225,848	0	64,473	0	166,329	112,736	247,930	5,005	95,474	0	101,996	194	52,641	244,306	82,594	0	36,124	16,046	Total
	343,538					882,310												

Total container handling			Total Outgoing Goods			Number of Arrived Marine Floats					
Total	Outgoing	Incoming	Quantity (in tons)	Type of Goods	Port	Total	Wooden Ships	Oil Tankers	Ships Containers	General Cargo Ships	Port
			0		Hodeidah	40	0	6	19	15	Hodeidah
			0		Salif	10	0	0	0	10	Salif
			0		Ras Issa	5	0	5	0	0	Ras Issa
19,578	9,166	10,412	0	Total		55	0	11	19	25	Total

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Activ ity of Yemeni Red Sea Ports (Hodeidah – Sal if – Ras Issa Oil Terminal) during February 2024

Total	Quality of Unleaded Fuel Products (in Tons)					Quality of Unloaded Goods (in Tons)												Port
	Kerosene	Gas	Mazut	Diesel	Petroleum	Containers	General Goods	Steel	Woods	Cement + Clinker	Other food	Corn + Soybeans	Bulk Wheat	Sugar	Flour	Rice	Vegetable Oils	
618,149	0	0	14,929	50,507	56,280	166,816	0	9,405	3,796	0	896	120,166	144,856	0	10,482	40,016	0	Hodeidah
207,494	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	38,300	0	0	99,194	70,000	0	0	0	Salif
140,053	0	29,421	0	81,621	29,011	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Ras Issa
965,696	0	29,421	14,929	132,128	85,291	166,816	0	9,405	3,796	38,300	896	120,166	244,050	70,000	10,482	40,016	0	Total
	261,769					703,927												

Total container handling			Total Outgoing Goods			Number of Arrived Marine Floats					
Total	Outgoing	Incoming	Quantity (in tons)	Type of Goods	Port	Total	Wooden Ships	Oil Tankers	Ships Containers	General Cargo Ships	Port
			5,000	Bran	Hodeidah	35	0	6	14	15	Hodeidah
			0	"	Salif	6	0	0	0	6	Salif
			0	"	Ras Issa	7	0	7	0	0	Ras Issa
14,601	7,707	6,894	5,000	Total		48	0	13	14	21	Total

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Activity of Yemeni Red Sea Ports (Hodeidah – Salif – Ras Issa Oil Terminal) during March 2024

Total	Quality of Unleaded Fuel Products (in Tons)					Quality of Unloaded Goods (in Tons)												Port
	Kerosene	Gas	Mazut	Diesel	Petroleum	Containers	General Goods	Steel	Woods	Cement + Clinker	Other food	Corn + Soybeans	Bulk Wheat	Sugar	Flour	Rice	Vegetable Oils	
516,936	0	0	15,013	11,473	41,697	138,193	0	32,830	6,547	0	2,208	61,329	137,856	23,577	11,989	15,387	18,837	Hodeidah
240,508	0	0	0	0	0	0	44,061	29,847	0	139,400	0	0	22,600	0	0	4,600	0	Salif
155,649	0	20,241	0	80,520	54,888	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Ras Issa
913,093	0	20,241	15,013	91,993	96,585	138,193	44,061	62,677	6,547	139,400	2,208	61,329	160,456	23,577	11,989	19,987	18,837	Total
	223,832					689,261												

Total	Outgoing	Incoming
13,019	7,455	5,564

Quantity (in tons)	Type of Goods	Port
0	Bran	Hodeidah
2,154	Bran	Salif
0	"	Ras Issa
2,154	Total	

Total	Wooden Ships	Oil Tankers	Ships Containers	General Cargo Ships	Port
31	0	4	11	16	Hodeidah
8	0	0	0	8	Salif
5	0	5	0	0	Ras Issa
44	0	9	11	24	Total

ATTACHMENTS

Activity of Yemeni Red Sea Ports (Hodeidah – Salif – Ras Issa Oil Terminal) during April 2024

Total	Quality of Unleaded Fuel Products (in Tons)					Quality of Unloaded Goods (in Tons)												Port
	Kerosene	Gas	Mazut	Diesel	Petroleum	Containers	General Goods	Steel	Woods	Cement + Clinker	Other food	Corn + Soybeans	Bulk Wheat	Sugar	Flour	Rice	Vegetable Oils	
623,030	0	0	14,806	29,391	12,219	144,690	0	58,134	2,710	0	1,518	56,297	285,738	0	17,527	0	0	Hodeidah
242,846	0	0	0	0	0	0	53,053	16,826	6,943	7,700	0	28,950	129,374	0	0	0	0	Salif
263,075	0	87,333	0	71,414	104,328	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Ras Issa
1,128,951	0	87,333	14,806	100,805	116,547	144,690	53,053	74,960	9,653	7,700	1,518	85,247	415,112	0	17,527	0	0	Total
	319,491					809,460												

Total	Outgoing	Incoming
11,402	5,366	6,036

Quantity (in tons)	Type of Goods	Port
0	Bran	Hodeidah
0	Bran	Salif
0	"	Ras Issa
0	Total	

Total	Wooden Ships	Oil Tankers	Ships Containers	General Cargo Ships	Port
36	0	3	13	20	Hodeidah
9	0	0	0	9	Salif
7	0	7	0	0	Ras Issa
52	0	10	13	29	Total

ATTACHMENTS

Activity of Yemeni Red Sea Ports (Hodeidah – Salif – Ras Issa Oil Terminal) during May 2024

Total	Quality of Unleaded Fuel Products (in Tons)					Quality of Unloaded Goods (in Tons)											Port	
	Kerosene	Gas	Mazut	Diesel	Petroleum	Containers	General Goods	Steel	Woods	Cement + Clinker	Other food	Corn + Soybeans	Bulk Wheat	Sugar	Flour	Rice		Vegetable Oils
498,146	0	14,820	0	27,429	0	111,926	0	59,367	3,479	0	0	59,955	117,749	25,082	16,721	61,618	0	Hodeidah
319,039	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15,289	0	92,400	0	0	162,150	49,200	0	0	0	Salif
183,546	0	0	0	79,212	104,334	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Ras Issa
1,000,731	0	14,820	0	106,641	104,334	111,926	0	74,656	3,479	92,400	0	59,955	279,899	74,282	16,721	61,618	0	Total
225,795						774,936												

Total	Outgoing	Incoming
10,723	6,082	4,641

Quantity (in tons)	Type of Goods	Port
0	Bran	Hodeidah
0	Bran	Salif
0	"	Ras Issa
0	Total	

Total	Wooden Ships	Oil Tankers	Ships Containers	General Cargo Ships	Port
34	0	4	10	20	Hodeidah
9	0	0	0	9	Salif
5	0	5	0	0	Ras Issa
48	0	9	10	29	Total

ATTACHMENTS

Activity of Yemeni Red Sea Ports (Hodeidah – Salif – Ras Issa Oil Terminal) during June 2024

Total	Quality of Unleaded Fuel Products (in Tons)					Quality of Unloaded Goods (in Tons)											Port	
	Kerosene	Gas	Mazut	Diesel	Petroleum	Containers	General Goods	Steel	Woods	Cement + Clinker	Other food	Corn + Soybeans	Bulk Wheat	Sugar	Flour	Rice		Vegetable Oils
467,950	0	0	9,790	8,354	30,456	96,513	0	35,870	6,546	0	502	30,784	230,450	0	18,685	0	0	Hodeidah
348,983	0	0	0	0	0	0	53,407	32,346	0	147,400	0	9,700	56,915	49,215	0	0	0	Salif
202,073	0	44,782	0	63,425	93,866	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Ras Issa
1,019,006	0	44,782	9,790	71,779	124,322	96,513	53,407	68,216	6,546	147,400	502	40,484	287,365	49,215	18,685	0	0	Total
250,673					768,333													

Total	Outgoing	Incoming
8,192	4,165	4,027

Quantity (in tons)	Type of Goods	Port
31	Cigarettes	Hodeidah
0		Salif
0	"	Ras Issa
31	Total	

Total	Wooden Ships	Oil Tankers	Ships Containers	General Cargo Ships	Port
29	1	3	10	15	Hodeidah
9	0	0	0	9	Salif
4	0	4	0	0	Ras Issa
42	1	7	10	24	Total